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FOREWORD
The focus on Russian intervention in Ukraine in
2014-15 has obscured other areas of contention which
previously were prominent and problematic in relations between the United States and Russia. One such
area is the strenuous Russian objection to U.S. plans
for ballistic missile defense, most recently in the form
of the European Phased Adaptive Approach (EPAA).
At some point in the near future, the issue of missile defense will once more be on the table with Russia; whether as a result of a relaxation of tensions allowing renewed bilateral discussion of security issues,
or indeed because of an immediate threat of Russian
escalatory action in response to the United States rolling out missile defense capabilities. In either case, U.S.
policymakers and negotiators need to be prepared
and fully acquainted with the wide range of issues
at stake.
In this respect, both the current monograph and
its predecessor, European Missile Defense and Russia,
provide an essential grounding in the Russian approach to missile defense, and crucially, to specific inconsistencies in Russian objections to U.S. plans. The
Strategic Studies Institute therefore recommends both
monographs to those both engaged with studying and
managing Russia, and mitigating the adverse consequences of Russia’s distinctive world view.
			
			
DOUGLAS C. LOVELACE, JR.
			Director
			
Strategic Studies Institute and
			
U.S. Army War College Press
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SUMMARY
Russia has made air and space defense, including
ballistic missile defense (BMD), a top priority, while
at the same time protesting vehemently against the
deployment of U.S. missile defense technology in Europe, which Moscow claims upsets strategic stability
and increases the danger of war. Russian declaratory
policy provides U.S. policymakers with significant
material to develop an approach intended to mitigate
Russian obstructionism over European Phased Adaptive Approach (EPAA) and U.S. plans for BMD more
broadly. Put simply, Russian complaints at the dangerous irresponsibility of the United States introducing new anti-missile capabilities ring hollow, when
Russia is forging ahead with its own program to do
precisely the same.
U.S. officials have repeatedly attempted to allay
Russian concerns over the potential for EPAA and its
predecessor systems to compromise Russian strategic
deterrence. These attempts have foundered on Russian concerns, some of which appear disingenuous,
but others of which are genuinely rooted in an entirely different Russian approach to the purpose and
status of nuclear weapons. Despite the current hiatus in relations, opportunities for meaningful dialog
with Russia on missile defense will arise again in the
future. At that point, U.S. representatives should be
fully informed on the scope and ambition of Russia’s
own missile defense programs. This will allow them
not only to rebut some of the more facile Russian accusations, but also to counter some persistent Russian
arguments relating to strategic balance.
In brief, discussion of Russian capabilities should
be an integral part of future conversations with Rus-
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sia on the deployment of U.S. and allied BMD assets.
This monograph provides the necessary overview of
Russian plans for missile defenses, and the rhetoric
surrounding them.
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RUSSIAN BALLISTIC MISSILE DEFENSE:
RHETORIC AND REALITY
INTRODUCTION
While this monograph was being researched
and written, Russian actions in Crimea and eastern
Ukraine had brought U.S.-Russian relations to a new
low in the post-Cold War era. Normal relations and
conversations between the United States and Russia
were apparently on hold during an unprecedented, and apparently intractable, crisis of European
security.
But the longer view of relations between the two
former superpowers shows precedents that suggest
relations stand a strong chance of early recovery, despite Russia’s hard line and unpalatable actions.1 With
or without this recovery, some persistent challenges
to the relationship will remain; the state of relations
will affect how these challenges are presented, rather
than the underlying contradictions themselves. One
of these challenges is ballistic missile defense (BMD),
and its implications for nuclear deterrence.
For the past 7 years, plans for BMD capability in
Europe have been a consistent sticking point in relations between the United States and Russia. In brief,
Russia’s strenuous opposition to these plans is based
on claims, not all of them disingenuous, that this capability is intended to compromise Russia’s nuclear
deterrent capability.2
Yet, all discussion of the subject highlights the
current and proposed U.S. deployments and entirely
ignores Russia’s own missile interception systems,
which are claimed to have comparable capability.
While Moscow continues to strengthen its armed forc-
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es and seeks to reduce its capability gap with the United States, the perception of vulnerability leads Russia
to invest heavily in strategic weapons and aerospace
defense, including defense against both nuclear missiles and precision guided munitions.
Russia protests that U.S. SM-3 missiles pose a potential threat to strategic stability, and has made belligerent threats of direct military action to prevent
their deployment. But no mention at all is made of
the strategic implications of Russia’s own S-400 and
S-500 systems, despite the fact that if the performance
and capabilities claimed for them by Russian sources
are accurate, they pose at least as great a threat to
deterrence as do SM-3s.
This monograph therefore aims to describe Russia’s claims for its missile defense systems and, where
possible, to assess the likelihood that these claims are
true. This will form a basis for considering whether
discussion of Russian capabilities should be an integral part of future conversations with Russia on the
deployment of U.S. and allied BMD assets.
An assessment of this kind requires an essential
caveat. Research for this monograph has been conducted from open sources in Russian and English,
and unclassified discussion with knowledgeable individuals on both sides of the debate. As such, it has
obvious limitations, especially in a field where the fine
detail of capabilities and deployments is highly classified. In addition, the proliferation of designations
used by Russia for systems still in development, and
the confused and contradictory reporting of them in
open source media, adds a further layer of obfuscation. In the words of one assessment—entitled, tellingly, “Experts Baffled by Profusion of Russian Missile
Projects”—the resulting “linguistic labyrinth has been
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further confused, perhaps deliberately, by a proliferation of new names in Russian reports.”3
The descriptions of specific Russian projects in this
monograph are therefore a synthesis of public declarations by Russia as carried in open sources, rather
than an authoritative and verified systems handbook.
Nonetheless their value is important, since responses
to Russian claims for their missile defense systems
must necessarily rely on public pronouncements.
RUSSIAN PRIORITIES
Missile defense is an illusion—no matter how much
money you invest in it.
Dmitri Rogozin, Russian Deputy Prime Minister
responsible for the military-industrial complex4

This first public pronouncement reflects a widespread view, both in Russia and elsewhere, that successful missile defense is both immensely expensive
and technically not feasible. This reflects a long legacy
of costly and mostly fruitless efforts by American and
Soviet arms designers in the field.5 But the view is at
odds with current Russian defense policy, which is
devoting considerable resources to aerospace defense
as part of the current Russian rearmament program.6
The program to develop and deploy means of air
and space defense is one of the largest components of
the widely-reported State Armaments Program for the
period up to 2020, and will receive approximately 20
percent of the program’s total budget, which in absolute terms means around 3.4 trillion rubles (more than
$100 billion).7 Under the approved plan, space- and
land-based missile attack early warning systems will
be modernized and provided with new components;
3

a whole series of entirely new anti-aircraft and antimissile weapon systems will be introduced; Moscow’s
ballistic missile defenses will be thoroughly overhauled; several new antimissile production plants will
be built to handle huge procurement contracts; and a
new integrated air and space defense command-andcontrol information system will be established.8
The irony lies in the fact that Moscow has made
air and space defense, including BMD, a top priority,
while at the same time protesting vehemently against
the deployment of U.S. missile defense technology in
Europe, which allegedly upsets strategic stability and
increases the danger of war. In his 2012 pre-election
treatise on defense policy and national security, Russian President Vladimir Putin ranked aerospace defense second in importance to Russia after the nuclear
deterrent.9 A year later, Chief of the General Staff
(CGS) of the Russian Armed Forces Valery Gerasimov
confirmed that priority in the development of Russia’s armed forces through 2020 would continue to be
given to the strategic nuclear forces and the air and
space defense system.10
Although brought to the fore by Russia’s new financial capabilities and emphasis on military regeneration, emphasis on missile defense is, in fact, not a
novelty in the evolving Russian military doctrine. As
a former high-ranking official in the Ronald Reagan
administration put it: “The Kremlin, going back to Soviet days, has always believed missile defenses were
not simply legitimate but necessary.” Furthermore,
the Russian military pursued the development and
deployment of such weaponry without interruption
“including and notwithstanding its obligations under
the 1972 Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty.”11
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The following sections discuss the organization
of aerospace defense in Russia, Russia’s current and
planned BMD systems, the state of their manufacturers, and finally the rhetoric surrounding the development of missile defenses.
Russian Aerospace Defense Forces—
Current and Future Shape.
The Russian Aerospace Defense Forces (VKO)
were created in 2011 by a decree of former President
Dmitry Medvedev12 and ever since have been the subject of controversy. The birth pangs of the new organization perfectly reflect the circumstances surrounding the radical military reform launched by former
Defense Minister Anatoliy Serdyukov and the former
CGS General Nikolay Makarov in 2008.
According to a number of informed observers, the
most striking feature of the overall reform effort has
been the absence of a coherent definition of the precise
purpose of Russia’s military and threats it is supposed
to counter.13 In the course of the changes, which strove
to reduce the number and size of various command
structures and abolish unnecessary tiers of command,
the air force lost the bureaucratic tussle for control
over the VKO, which thus gained space to develop on
its own. The decree establishing the VKO was issued
at the end of 2011. But even at that time next to nothing was known about its content, the remit of the new
armed service, or even the date of signature. It appears
that senior Russian officers, even those who had given
media interviews with confident predictions about the
future shape of the VKO and who were later put in
charge of a very different organization from the one
they had described, were in all probability kept in the
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dark until the final political decision had been made.14
In late-2012, senior officers were explaining that the
process of integration of VKO into Russia’s command
and control system was still ongoing, and while the
new command was scheduled to take on its full duties
in 2015, integration would continue through 2020.15
The Russian Ministry of Defense has now declared
the main outlines of the new armed service. The core of
the VKO consists of Air Force’s surface-to-air missile
(SAM) brigades in the Moscow region and the space
forces. The latter, overseen by the Space Command,
have seen very few changes in their organization.
They include the Main Missile Attack Early Warning
Center (SPRN) in Solnechnogorsk, the Main Space
Surveillance Center (SKKP) in Noginsk, and the Main
Trial Centre for Testing and Control of Space Assets.16
However, the VKO’s air and missile defense component, under the umbrella of the Air and Missile Defense Command, looks curiously weak. The VKO took
over SAM systems but not air defense aircraft, which
are still assigned to the Military Districts and to the
air force. The three air defense brigades assigned to
Air and Missile Defense Command are supposed to
protect Moscow and 26 administrative regions around
the capital (the so called Central Industrial Region)
which is home to 30 percent of Russia’s population
and lists 140 separate high-priority facilities.17 This
was a daunting task even for the predecessor of Air
and Missile Defense Command, the Special Purpose
Command, which had Su-27, MiG-29, and MiG-31 air
defense regiments at its disposal. It is therefore difficult to perceive how VKO can fulfill its stated role as
a stand-alone command. In an ideal scenario air force,
missile defense, the SRPN and SKPP systems should
cooperate (they even share a common catalog of tar-
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gets with single designations), but, as one Russian defense analyst put it, “in practice such integration will
be difficult to pull off.”18
Meanwhile, the complexity of the VKO structure
has been openly criticized, with growing calls for reorganization. Liberal military analysts Alexei Arbatov
and General Vladimir Dvorkin decried their lack of
“logical command structure and a unified information system” and, most importantly, the fact that their
existence is not compatible with Russian “economic
or military-technical capabilities.”19 Aleksandr Tarnayev, a member of the Russian State Duma Defense
Committee, complained that due to insufficient funds,
the VKO command could not fulfill its tasks. The
General Staff, Tarnayev asserted, lacks the means to
constantly monitor Russian airspace, since re-equipping the VKO with modern high technology assets is
progressing too slowly. Furthermore, the former unified system of air defense in the country had broken
into five parts: four air defense Military Districts and
the VKO.20 As part of his review of reform decisions
made by his predecessor, in 2012 incoming CGS Gerasimov asked for “clarification” of the development of
the VKO, including the manner of its creation and the
number of mistakes and corrections needed.21
Protecting the important military and government infrastructure in the industrial heart of the
country is not the only mission the VKO forces have
been officially assigned. The Ministry of Defense lists
other tasks:
•	
Providing command authorities with highly
accurate information on detection of ballistic missile launches and prevention of missile
attacks;

7

•	Destruction of the ballistic missile warheads of
the potential enemy in case of crucial governmental facilities being attacked;
•	Defense of the major command control stations
and governmental facilities, armed formations,
the most important industrial and economic
centers, and other installations against the enemy’s joint air- and space-based strike weapons
(SVKN) in the zone of probable damage;
•	Monitoring space objects and identification of
potential threats to the Russian Federation in
space and from space and prevention of attacks
as needed;
•	Carrying out spacecraft launches and placing
into orbit and controlling satellite systems, including integrated ones (intended to be used for
both military and civilian purposes), in flight,
and using specific ones to provide the Russian Federation Armed Forces with necessary
data; and,
•	Maintaining both military and integrated satellite systems with launching installations and
assets of control in working order; and “a number of other tasks.”22
These are clearly far beyond the current VKO capabilities. But objections to the VKO’s current structure
and purpose do not take into account the fact the extended process of integration into Russia’s command
and control system, which itself has undergone a
significant overhaul over recent years.23
A clearer picture of the future shape and mission
of the VKO was provided by Deputy Defense Minister
Yuri Borisov and Major General Sergei Yagolnikov,
Director of the Second Scientific and Research Insti-
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tute of the Defense Ministry (responsible for air and
space defense), in the spring of 2014. The VKO will
be “modernized” over the next 6 years, they said, and
its structure overhauled in 2015. Under the approved
plan, the VKO will comprise four subdivisions. These
will include a space- and ground-based intelligencegathering and ballistic missile early warning system,
an air and space defense command, a command-andcontrol structure, as well as a logistics support branch.
Thus, the ministry plans to integrate the activities of
all units responsible for conducting Russia’s air and
space defense into one branch. According to Borisov,
investments in new arms systems and other military hardware for the new command should reach 2
trillion rubles ($55 billion) by 2020.24
The overhauled structure would be intended to
integrate Russia’s response to potential attacks into
a single system of air and space defense. Emphasis
would be put on enhancing the role played by radar
in detecting airborne threats. The Defense Ministry is
working on about 100 research and development projects for new VKO weapon systems, to be financed out
of the 2 trillion rubles.25
Yagolnikov presented the principal philosophy
behind the planned reform in a speech at the annual
session of the influential Non-departmental Expert
Council on VKO Problems on February 28, 2014,
which was later republished by the authoritative military publication Voyenno-promyshlennyy Kuryer (VPK).
Yagolnikov identified two possible approaches to
the reorganization of Russian air and space defense.
The first scenario assumed continuation of the buildup of the VKO with a unified command-and-control
structure and an exclusive area of responsibility. The
second scenario assumed merging the VKO and the
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Air Force into a single armed service, and dividing operational and administrative functions between a new
Air and Space Command and individual Military Districts. In order to assess the two options, Yagolnikov
outlined three basic tasks of the VKO:
1. Contribution to strategic nuclear deterrence
through early warning against decapitating and disarming nuclear attacks and through defending strategic command-and-control systems and strategic forces
against such attacks;
2. Protection of Russian state boundaries in airspace, control over airspace, and cessation of attempts
at its misuse; control over outer space; and,
3. Air and space defense of forces and installations
in regional military conflicts.26
Reviewing the tasks individually by use of mathematical modeling, the Ministry of Defense came to
the conclusion that the first option, a gradual build-up
of the VKO, is best suited for their fulfillment.
The problems and challenges facing the VKO are
complex and not limited to modernizing its structures and re-equipping its units with state-of-the-art
systems such as the much vaunted S-500 air defense
system. The challenges are also organizational and
systemic, and extend to a lack of qualified personnel.27
The timeframe and the outline of reorganization have
been set. The eventual effectiveness of the new structure can be assessed after its results emerge.
Almaz-Antey.
The chaos and unpredictability surrounding the
establishment of the VKO is mirrored in developments
around the main airspace defense technology manu-
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facturers. The company now known as Almaz-Antey
originated in the merger of two prestigious defense
manufacturers: Almaz, which produced long range air
defense systems, and Antey, which dealt with short
range and troop air defense. After a complex and controversial combining of the two entities, “Joint-Stock
Company Almaz-Antey Aerospace Defense Concern”
(OAO Kontsern PVO Almaz-Antey) was established by
President Vladimir Putin in 2002 uniting no fewer than
46 enterprises, including factories, research and production organizations, design bureau, and research
and development institutes involved in the development and manufacture of short-, medium-, and longrange air defense missile systems, radar surveillance
systems, and automated control systems. This was
part of a broader push to unite splintered pieces of
the sprawling military-industrial complex, and other
industries ravaged by underinvestment and lack of direction during the chaotic 1990s. In 2007, the company
was enlarged and now includes around 50 enterprises
in 17 Russian regions, employing over 94,000 people.
The Russian state is the sole shareholder.28
Along with other “national champions” created
by the Kremlin with the purpose of monopolizing the
domestic market and attaining a competitive edge
over global rivals, Almaz-Antey has performed extremely well. The group produces the whole range of
Russian top-line anti-aircraft and anti-missile systems,
including S-300PMU2 Favorit, S-300VM Antey 2500,
S-400 Triumf, S-300 Rif-M (ship-based), 9K37 Buk, and
9K330 Tor. Approximately 90 percent of its revenues
come from the defense sector, with half of the total
made up by exports. In 2012, the company managed
to increase its defense revenues by an impressive 62
percent to $5.7 billion, which placed it among the top
15 arms manufacturers worldwide.29
11

Yet not even a company the size of Almaz-Antey
is able to produce advanced anti-aircraft systems on
its own, and has to purchase hardware from various
state-owned and private enterprises. This is especially
the case for radar, communications, electronic warfare
and electronic countermeasures technology. As part
of his primary concern with airspace defense, President Putin has long sought to establish a horizontally
integrated holding company, which would serve the
interests of the VKO. One of the proposed solutions involved integrating Almaz-Antey into Rostec, a bloated conglomerate of more than 600 entities overseen by
Sergey Chemezov, which includes radar manufacturer
Vega and JSC Sozvezdiye, responsible for developing
and producing electronic warfare and radio communications technology. The second proposal envisaged
selling Almaz-Antey to the RTI group, which specializes in producing early warning radars (Voronezh
for instance), space communications technology and
control systems for anti-aircraft weaponry. In the end,
Putin was content with neither solution. First, Rostec
was considered cumbersome and ungovernable even
by Russian standards; and, second, Almaz-Antey was
regarded as too strategically important to pass to private hands, as RTI is majority-owned by AFK Sistema,
a holding controlled by magnate Vladimir Yevtushenkov. A compromise was therefore found under which
Almaz-Antey is to become the core of the VKO industry. It should absorb several independent subcontractors (mainly satellite manufacturer Kometa) and appoint Sergei Chemezov head of its supervisory board
in order to ensure harmonized relations with Rostec.30
On July 16, 2014, the U.S. Department of Treasury
placed Almaz-Antey on the Sectoral Sanctions Identification List, cutting it off from the American financial
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system and potential American subcontractors or clients.31 The EU imposed a similar set of sanctions on
Almaz-Antey 2 weeks later, noting that the company
makes missiles that have been used by pro-Russian
groups to shoot down aircraft over eastern Ukraine.32
According to the General Director of Almaz-Antey
Yan Novikov, the sanctions will have no tangible
impact on the company.33
New Hardware—Radars.
Commenting on the state of the Russian militaryindustrial complex, Igor Ashurbeyli, former chief designer of Almaz-Antey, used a medical metaphor, saying that the patient is “more alive than dead.”34 In each
sector of the Russian defense industry, where export
revenues were available, they allowed capacity and
manpower to be retained during the long period of
underfunding following the end of the Soviet Union.
In the case of aerospace technology, which makes up
by far the biggest share of Russia’s arms exports, the
patient is doing relatively well.
New hardware has recently been added in all
important branches of aerospace defense. The earlywarning systems for detecting incoming ballistic missiles or threats from space (SPRN and SKKP) consist
of satellites and ground-based radar and observation
sites. Since March 2012, four new satellites of the Oko
system have provided Russia with practically permanent coverage of the continental United States, but
they are unable to detect launches from other areas.35
The ground-based early-warning radar chain is being modernized and relocated to Russia. The most
important additions include three Voronezh-type radars, which became operational after long delays in
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Lekhtusi (east of St. Petersburg) in 2012 and Armavir
in 2013. As of June 2014, two additional radars of this
class had begun initial operations: one in Mishelevka
(near Irkutsk), one in Kaliningrad; and four others
were under construction (Vorkuta, Barnaul, Orsk,
and Yeniseysk).36 Voronezh-class radars have an operational range of 6,000 kilometers (km) (3,728 miles).
Compared to previous generation stations, they can be
more quickly established and require a smaller crew
to operate.37 In keeping with the usual tenor of Russian claims for new systems, Deputy Defense Minister
Yuriy Borisov said “no one else can match these stations.”38 It was the Voronezh radar in Armavir, which
in 2013 detected a launch of two ballistic missiles in
the Mediterranean Sea, which later turned out to be
part of Israel’s test of its missile defense shield.39
Russia has also begun testing a new radar designed
to detect highly maneuverable aerial targets, including cruise missiles and unmanned aerial vehicles, at
a range of up to 3,000-km (over 1,800 miles), allowing it to cover most of Europe. The new-generation
over-the-horizon radar, dubbed Container, was put
on trial duty near the town of Kovylkino southeast
of Moscow in December 2013. According to Defense
Minister Sergei Shoigu, Container will allow Russia to
expand its monitoring range and control over the situation “to the west” and should be fully operational by
the end of 2015.40 According to Russian CGS Valery
Gerasimov, the completed airspace defense system
will ensure guaranteed detection of enemy ballistic
and long-range cruise missiles at launch.41
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Russian Designation

NATO Designation

S-300P/PT

SA-10A Grumble A

S-300PS

SA-10B Grumble B

S-300PM/PMU

SA-10C Grumble C

S-300V

SA-12A/B Gladiator / Giant

S-300PMU1

SA-20 Gargoyle A

S-300PMU2 Favorit

SA-20 Gargoyle B

S-300VM/Antey-2500

SA-23A/B Gladiator / Giant

S-400 Triumf

SA-21 Growler A

S-500 Triumfator

Table 1. New Hardware - Missile Systems.
S-400 Triumf.
The most significant upgrade of the VKO air and
space defense component currently under way is the
introduction into service of S-400 systems produced by
Almaz-Antey. The S-400 Triumf (North Atlantic Treaty Organization [NATO] designation SA-21 Growler)
is in fact the most recent operational upgrade of the
extensive S-300 SAM family. The antiballistic missile
capabilities of the older versions were comparable to
those of the American PAC-1 and PAC-2 Patriot series.42 In the case of the S-400, however, analysts largely agree that the system “in many respects is more
capable than the U.S. Patriot series and offers mobility
and performance and thus survivability much better
than that of Patriot.”43 The main distinctions between
the S-400 and its predecessors lie in the refinements to
the radar, software (thanks to Russia’s post-Cold War
large-scale access to Western technology markets, and
Western computational technology) and several new
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missile types. As a result, the S-400 can be armed with
flexible mixes of missiles designed to counter a range
of different targets, providing a truly multilayered
defense capability.
The S-400 is equipped with sophisticated electronic warfare systems. Hence, jamming of the S-400s
acquisition and engagement radars will prove challenging, because they employ countermeasures such
as rapid frequency-hopping and agile beam-steering.
The S-400 also employs new methods that reportedly
have shown some ability to detect stealth aircraft.
Among the most potent is the use of new radar systems such as the Nebo-M, which employ a combination of sophisticated radar systems designed to track
and engage stealth aircraft at tactically meaningful
distances.44
Like the Patriot SAM system, the S-400 has been
designed to counter a wide range of airborne and airspace targets, not only ballistic missiles, and until now
the main concerns over its potency have been focused
on manned aircraft.45 For the interception of ballistic
targets, it uses the 48N6 and 9M96 families of longand medium-range missiles with a maximum range
of up to 250-km.46 That is comparable to the U.S. Terminal High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) system,
designed solely for missile defense. THAAD is intended to shoot down short-, medium- and intermediaterange ballistic missiles, although owing to a different
design philosophy, the maximum THAAD operating
altitude (around 150-km) is significantly higher than
that of its Russian rival.47 The 48N6 missile is reportedly suited for destroying medium-range ballistic
missiles with a maximum range of 3,500-km flying at
4,800 meters per second, at a distance of 5 to 60 km and
an altitude of 2 to 27 km. The warhead is able not only
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to deflect the incoming ballistic missile but also effectively destroy it.48 In the case of the better-known and
extremely maneuverable 9M96 missile, the producer
claims an 80 percent hit probability against a ballistic
missile and a 70 percent kill probability against a particular part of a ballistic missile (i.e., warhead).49
Very few details, except for vague declarations
by military officials, are known about the ultra-longrange 40N6 missile, which is supposed to have a range
of up to 400-km.50 It is not known whether a one-stage
or a two-stage rocket will carry its warhead, and there
are some doubts about its maneuverability due to its
size.51 Some estimates52 allege a maximum speed of
4,800 meters per second, which would slightly overmatch the performance of the U.S. SM-3 Block IIA
missile, to be rolled out in 2018 at earliest in Phase 3 of
the European Phased Adaptive Approach (EPAA).53
The 40N6 missile supposedly passed all trials in July
2012, and according to Major General Andrei Dyomin, the Chief of Staff of the Air and Missile Defense
Command, was supposed to enter service “soon” afterwards.54 Military analysts are less optimistic and
estimate the 40N6 will not be deployed before 2015.55
The sole supplier of missiles for the S-400 system is
Moscow-based manufacturer MMZ Avangard, which
is part of Almaz-Antey. In its latest available annual
report for 2012, the company stated that it was finishing work on starting serial production of the 40N6
missile.56 No information on its performance or commissioning has been released since. The situation
was pointedly summarized in June 2014 by Russian
defense expert Aleksandr Stepanov:
Although official sources have repeatedly stated that
the testing of new long-range missiles is completed

17

and that it will be adopted in the near future, on the
sidelines they are saying the opposite.57

The VKO forces around Moscow have command
of three S-400 regiments (in Elektrostal, Dimitrov, and
Zvenigorod), which means six battalions in total, with
eight launchers per battalion.58 Furthermore, one additional regiment should be put under the VKO command by the end of 2014, concluding the first phase
of the VKO rearmament.59 Not all S-400 deployments,
however, have ended up in VKO hands. During the
2009–12 time frame, most new deliveries went far
away from the capital, apparently under the influence of the air force.60 Priority was given to potential
areas of vulnerability in the vicinity of Russian borders. As early as 2009, one battalion was reportedly
deployed in the Far East near Nakhodka to counter
the potential threat posed by North Korea’s missile
tests.61 A whole regiment was permanently stationed
there in August 2012.62 More surprisingly, the Pacific
Fleet should receive an unspecified number of additional S-400 units “for the protection of Kamchatka”
by the end of 2014.63 The second border destination of
Russia’s most advanced anti-aircraft and anti-missile
system was Kaliningrad where the first battalion under the aegis of the Baltic Fleet was commissioned in
April 2012.64 Finally, one S-400 regiment was stationed
in the Southern Military District near Novorossiysk
at the end of 2012, this time with the Air Force.65 All
in all, out of seven regiments received by the armed
forces by the end of 2013, only three have been given
to the VKO, with one additional regiment promised
by the end of 2014.
According to the 2020 State Armament Program,
plans are to produce and deploy a total of 56 S-400
battalions, which translates into approximately 450
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launchers.66 This will be a demanding task for the defense industry. In order to accomplish it, 21 additional
regiments will have to be produced in the course of
the next 7 years, meaning three regiments per year.
Representatives of the S-400 manufacturer, AlmazAntey, assessed the current production capacities at
two to three regiments a year.67
In the past, Almaz has experienced difficulty completing the state defense order for supply of S-400 systems. This, at least according to the official version, was
what led to the surprise firing of Almaz chief designer
Igor Ashurbeyli in February 2011.68 Lately, the company has been investing in new facilities. In May 2014,
production started at a new building for S-300/S-400
assembly at Almaz-Antey’s North-Western Regional
Centre in St. Petersburg, with first batches planned to
roll out by the end of 2014.69 But at the moment, it is
safe to assume, as Almaz-Antey’s then-General Director Vladislav Menshchikov confirmed in 2012, that the
State Arms Program 2011–20 exceeds the company’s
existing capacity.70
Export to China.
In March 2014, the usually well-informed daily
Kommersant reported that President Vladimir Putin
had agreed “in principle” to the sale of S-400 systems
to China. Talks are now being held on the number
of systems and their cost, but even if specific agreements are reached, the Chinese armed forces will not
be able to receive the complexes “earlier than 2016.”71
Given the apparently stretched production capacities
of Almaz-Antey, this still seems to be an optimistic
estimate.
China’s desire to acquire an unnamed number of
S-400 battalions was reported unofficially for the first
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time in 2011. However, the Russian military predictably asserted that first they have to receive a sufficient
number of the S-400 systems in their own inventory
before the complex would be exported. Another objection was raised by Russia’s security services, which
feared (quite justifiably) that the Chinese intended to
copy the necessary technical elements of the system to
create their own air defense weaponry on this basis.
Supposedly, these problems have been resolved.
An agreement between Russia and China on intellectual property rights in the arms trade has entered
in force. According to Kommersant information, the
delivery to China of two to four Triumf battalions is
now being discussed, and the client’s main desire is to
obtain complete information on the specifications and
performance characteristics of the new complex.72
Defense experts are skeptical about the deal coming
through until the requirements of the VKO and the air
force are met. Even if the sale eventually takes place,
it will certainly not include the newest long-range interceptors.73 The last Chinese-Russian contract involving advanced air defense systems was sealed in 2007.
Under the terms of that contract, the Chinese armed
forces received 15 S-300PMU2 battalions, which were
supplied to protect the largest cities such as Beijing
and Shanghai. The development of the S-300PMU2
Favorit (NATO designation SA-20B Gargoyle), which
was the last of the S-300P variants to carry the S-300P
designation, was completed in 1997.74
The uncertain timeframe of the S-400 sale was
confirmed by Sergey Ivanov, the Chief of Staff of the
Russian Presidential Administration, and until 2007
Russia’s first civilian defense minister. In July 2014,
he remarked that if a contract were to be signed for
China to buy the system, it would still take a number
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of years for the deal to be completed. Several other
countries including Egypt, Kazakhstan, Belarus, Vietnam, Armenia, Saudi Arabia, Turkey, and Serbia have
also expressed interest in purchasing the system.75
S-500 Triumfator M.
When the first reliable news about the development
of the fifth-generation air defense system surfaced in
2009, the S-500 Triumfator M (sometimes also designated as Prometheus) was supposed to be introduced
in 2012.76 The latest projections by the Russian military and Almaz-Antey experts presume that system
development will be completed in 2015, with the first
battalion to be deployed a year later.77 This still seems
to be a very optimistic estimate, given the fact that the
S-400 experienced a 7-year delay in development.78
In contrast to the S-400, whose primary purpose
was air defense, the S-500 is intended to be a fullfledged anti-ballistic missile (ABM) system.79 Rather
than succeeding the S-400, it is intended to work in
conjunction with it. While the S-400 is designed to defend against short- and medium-range missiles, the
S-500 is designed to combat intercontinental ballistic
missiles (ICBMs).80 In 2012, the system had completed
the technical design phase and the estimated timeframe for its deployment was reported to be 2015–18.81
The exact specifications of the new airspace defense system remain classified, and the most detailed
comment to date on the design philosophy and implementation have been observations made by Russian
defense and industry officials in interviews. According to them, the S-500 is derived from the existing
S-400 Triumf, but reduced in dimensions and more
power-efficient. The choice of vehicles intended to
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carry the S-500 launchers, radars, command posts,
and other electronic equipment suggests a highly mobile and survivable system, built for “hide, shoot and
scoot” operations.82
Designed to intercept ballistic missiles at a height
of up to 200 kilometers and a maximum range of 600
kilometers, the system is expected to be able to shoot
down up to ten incoming ballistic missiles simultaneously. It also has an extended radar range compared
to the S-400.83 Russia’s Air Force Commander-in-Chief
Lieutenant General Viktor Bondarev claimed that the
S-500 will also have a response time of about three to
four seconds, which is considerably shorter than the
S-400, which is rated at nine to ten seconds.84
New S-500 Missiles.
What remains a source of speculation, however,
is the kind of interception the S-500 missiles will
use. One option is a nuclear blast because it can destroy “the entire cloud of incoming warheads with
no need to determine true threats from dummies.”85
Most of the missiles in the S-300 and S-400 systems
use high-explosive fragmentation warheads. Russia, however, is working on two new missiles that
have been designed for the S-500 (and the S-400): the
77N6-N and the 77N6-N1. They will be the first Russian missiles with inert warheads, which can destroy
nuclear warheads by hitting them with precision at
hypersonic speed (7-km per second).86 This would far
outmatch even the American SM-3 block IIA missile,
which is also currently under development and is to
be deployed from 2018 onwards. The Block II has a
projected maximum speed of roughly 4.5-km per
second and enhanced capability to address interme-
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diate-range ballistic missiles (IRBMs) and a limited
capability to address ICBMs.87 However, it is not clear
when the 77N6-N and the 77N6-N1 may enter service,
given that facilities for their production are still in
construction.88
Initially, two large factories in Kirov and Nizhniy Novgorod, the cost of which was estimated at 81
billion rubles, were supposed to start production of
77N6N and 77N6-N1 missiles “at the beginning of
2014.”89 Latest reports suggest that the Kirov facility should begin production at the end of 2015, with
full capacity utilization available in 2017.90 The Nizhniy Novgorod facility should be finished in 2016 and
employ 3,500 people.91 Given these time frames, it is
doubtful that the new generation hypersonic missiles
will enter service any time soon.
The absence of more advanced missiles in general is one of the major obstacles to fully equipping
the VKO with modern systems. The missile shortage
worsened after the production of the old S-300 was
stopped completely, even for exports.92 This has also
reflected workforce aging and the low replacement
rates of production equipment. In 2008, Almaz-Antey
agreed with the Defense Ministry on a plan for the
company’s modernization, but, due to the financial
crisis, those intentions never materialized. It took an
intensive campaign calling for overhaul and refurbishment to induce the presidential administration to
act. In February 2012, President Putin signed a Federal
Targeted Program for the development of the defense
industry to 2020, under which three trillion rubles
were promised to the military-industrial complex for
the modernization of its production facilities.93
Bottlenecks in missile production could cause further delay in the introduction of the S-500. The S-400 is
already in operation and, therefore, any further delays
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in 40N6 missile production will set upgrades back still
further. Unlike the S-400, the S-500 cannot employ
missiles used in the S-300 family, which means that the
range of the missiles suitable for the system is severely
limited.94 There are already signs that additional delays are to be expected. At first, the State Armament
Program 2011-20 projected purchases of 10 battalions
of the S-500.95 At the end of 2013, the Commander of
the VKO expected five batteries to be delivered by
2020, with first batches arriving in “several years.”96
The results of throwing more money at the defense industry remain to be seen. As defense analyst
Aleksandr Konovalov put it:
The country’s leadership looks at the defense sector
like a Coke machine. Put money in and get a bottle.
Nothing is that simple with the domestic military-industrial complex, and investing a lot of money doesn’t
guarantee getting production precisely on time. And
the discussion about the S-500 is questionable; it’s possible it doesn’t even exist in drawings.97

Whether or not the system really exists and regardless of what its real capabilities are if it does, Russian
senior officers are publicly confident about its performance, especially vis-à-vis American competitors.
Thus, the former Commander of the VKO, Colonel
General Oleg Ostapenko, claimed in 2012 that “the
S-500 will be better than any similar U.S. system. The
Americans have so far only hyped them up in the
electronic media, but we already in effect have a real
missile.” Declining to give the specifications and performance characteristics of the missile for the S-500, he
said “until it flies, we do not talk about these things.”98
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S-300PT

S-300PS/PMU

S-300V

S-300V

S-300PM/PMU1

S-300PM/PMU1

S-300PMU2

S-400

S-300VM

S-300VM

S-400

S-400

S-400

S-500

5V55K

5V55R

9M82

9M83

48N6

48N6E

48N6E2

48N6E3/DM

9M82M

9M83M

9M96E

9M96E2

40N6E

55R6M

SA-21

SA-21

SA-21

SA-23A

SA-23B

SA-21

SA-20B

SA-20A

SA-20A

SA-12A

SA-12B

SA-10B

SA-10A

System
(NATO)

TBD

-

1700

2600

2100

2100

2100

1800

1800

2000

2000

Missile Max
Speed (m/s)

5

5

25

Altitude
(min) (m)

30000

20000

30000

30000

25000

Altitude
(max) (m)

1

1

Range
(min) (km)

450

120

40

75

200

250

200

150

150

75

100

75

47

Range
(max) (km)

5800

1835

1835

1800-1900

5800

5800

1665

1480-1500

Missile
weight
(kg)

150

180

180

143

150

150

196

133

Warhead
weight
(kg)

Table 2. Area Defense SAM Parameters.

IOC

2011-2012

2011-2012

2011

2011

2009

1999

1990

1988

1988

1985

Note: The data have been collated from a range of open sources and should therefore be treated as indicative of Russian
claims rather than definitively accurate.

System (Russian)

Missile (Russian)

At Sea.
Russia is also working on naval versions of the
S-400 and S-500, but their deployment seems also to
be unlikely in the near future. According to a source
from the military-industrial complex, the S-400F, the
naval version of the S-400, was “practically ready”
in 2012, but no information about its commissioning
has yet appeared in open sources.99 The carriers of the
systems were supposed to be the three mothballed nuclear-powered Kirov-class missile cruisers (the Admiral Nakhimov, Admiral Lazarev, and Admiral Ushakov),
with 2020 given as the year of their reintroduction into
service.100
After years of delays, the refit of the Admiral Nakhimov finally began at the beginning of 2014. The cruiser
will be equipped with P-800 Oniks (SS-N-26) supersonic anti-ship cruise missiles, and the S-400 Triumf,
along with other weapon systems designed to shoot
down missiles and aircraft approaching the ship. The
refit should be completed in 2018.101 The other missile
cruisers, including the Pyotr Velikiy, the only Kirovclass ship active in service, are expected to be modernized as well, but no timeframes have been announced.
In March 2013, the Navy reportedly decided to
heavily modernize antisubmarine ships of the Project 1155 Fregat (NATO codename Udaloy) class and
equip them with the Redut air defense system with
interceptors from the S-400. A representative from the
Northern Shipyards design bureau, which built the
Project 1155 vessels and is among the front runners
in the competition for modernization of Project 1155,
said that:
the first modernized big antisubmarine ship will appear not earlier than in 2016: development of the lead
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project will take about 18 months. After that the technical project of modernization will be retrofitted for 2
to 4 years more.102

In February 2013, the Russian Navy approved a
preliminary design for the largest naval ship to be
built since 1989. According to the newspaper, Izvestia,
the new ship will be armed with anti-ship missiles,
cruise missiles, air defense and ballistic defense systems, including the S-500. However, no final decision
about its construction has been made, and it will take
2 to 3 years just to prepare technical documentation.103
Finally, the official designation for the naval version of
the S-500 does not appear to have been made known
publicly.
Moscow Defense System.
Meanwhile, the A-135 Moscow missile defense system, which is also part of the VKO and became operational in 1989, is being modernized under the SamoletM program. Originally, the A-135 was deployed with
two types of missiles capable of countering ballistic
targets: the shorter-range 53T6 (NATO designation
Gazelle) endo-atmospheric interceptor and the giant 51T6 (Gorgon) exo-atmospheric interceptor with
a 350-km range.104 Both were silo-launched and used
10 kiloton nuclear warheads to destroy their targets.
Between 2005 and 2007, the 51T6 missiles were decommissioned. Among the probable reasons were the
drawbacks of nuclear interception and the approaching end of the interceptors’ service life. This has left
the remaining 68 53T6 missiles as the sole operational
interceptors of the A-135 system.105 In 2007, financing
for the project increased sharply. According to some
sources, the missiles have had their nuclear warheads
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replaced with conventional explosives.106 Gazelles
are regularly tested to prolong their permitted service lives, with the last known launch taking place in
2012.107 In 2013, the command center and the powerful
radar assigned to the A-135 system underwent software upgrades.108
Designation
(Russian)

Designation
(NATO)

51T6

SH-11 Gorgon

53T6

SH-08 Gazelle

Missile Max
Speed (m/s)
5500

Apogee (km)

Missile weight
(kg)

Warhead

350

33,000

Nuclear

80

9693

HE (previously
nuclear)

Table 3. Silo-Based Missiles.
Gazelle has a maximum range of 60-km and is capable of intercepting targets at an altitude between
10 and 40-km. It can reach a speed of 5-km per second.109 VKO officers have enthusiastically praised the
supposed high effectiveness of the A-135. According
to Major General Andrei Dyomin, the Chief of Staff
of the Air and Missile Defense Command, ballistic
and air defense systems around the capital “can destroy 90% of targets in the event of a potential massive aerospace attack. This figure stands at 60% for the
Central Industrial Region.”110 However, Dyomin did
not elaborate on what a “massive aerospace attack”
means and which part of it the A-135 is supposed to
counter. Former Chief of the Strategic Missile Troops
Main Staff Colonel General Viktor Yesin, noted since
retirement for his off-message commentary, offered a
more reserved estimate. According to him, the Moscow system, “once it has been made fully ready, can at
best destroy several dozen intercontinental warheads
targeting its coverage area.”111 Critics point to a lack of
combat readiness, as the 53T6 nuclear warheads are
believed to be stored separately from their deliv28

ery vehicles. Reportedly, the warheads are mounted
together only during the time of “serious military
threat.”112 This “scandalous revelation, which according to some accounts bordered on treason,” was first
made by none other than former General Director of
Almaz-Antey Igor Ashurbeyli.113 As one Russian defense analyst put it, “even back in Soviet times, the
system’s capability was so limited as to be unsuitable
for defending against any serious strikes. At best it
could cope with a few single ballistic missiles.”114
It remains to be seen what additional capabilities the A-235 Samolet-M modernization program
will bring. According to latest available reports, the
A-235, just like its predecessor, was designed and developed by the Novator company in Yekaterinburg.
It is intended to be a fixed land-based ballistic missile
defense system and its new interceptors, upgraded
53T6 missiles with conventional as well as nuclear
warheads, will probably utilize the presently mothballed 51T6 (Gorgon) silos. It should have a range
of up to 100-km and an altitude of up to 30-km and
should be able to counter “the fastest ICBMs currently
in service.”115 The system will feature Russia’s first
anti-missile to employ hit-to-kill technology, which
will in all probability be its biggest limiting factor.
Reservations about the high-precision, high-altitude
kinetic intercept were expressed most prominently by
Aleksandr Konovalov, the President of the Institute
of Strategic Estimates, who stated that “it is doubtful
that the designers of Novator have achieved such a
remarkable result in the stratosphere.”116 That may
well be true. Russia began work on the A-235 in 1997,
and in 2011 the first test launches were conducted. The
system should by now have become operational, but
there appears to have been no mention of it in open
sources since 2012.
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Prioritizing Missile Defense.
Despite doubts over the delivery of actual capability, it is clear that Russia devotes significant attention
and considerable resources to ballistic missile defense.
Both the General Staff and the Kremlin consider capabilities in this branch indispensable for countering
current and future threats. CGS Gerasimov stated in
2013 that the center of gravity of combat operations is
shifting from the spheres of land and sea to the aerospace and information spheres, and that it is impossible to safeguard national security without a reliable
defense shield.117
Regional threats are important. Despite public
rhetoric, Russia is well aware of, and worried about,
the growing number of deployed ballistic missiles and
nations operating them, all of them dangerously close
to Russian borders. The most important proliferators include China and North Korea, with Pakistan,
India, and Iran also possessing significant arsenals of
theater-range ballistic missiles. Iran and North Korea
are actively developing ballistic missiles with strategic
reach. Due to its massive size, much of Russia’s territory is well within the reach of IRBMs and ICBMs
launched from Iran, North Korea, and especially China.118 While Russia is not antagonistic toward any of
these countries, it could be painfully vulnerable in any
contingency. Sergey Ivanov touched upon the issue in
May 2013:
We are surrounded by a raging sea of threats and
problems. These are Muslim fundamentalism, North
Korea’s nuclear device, for sure, and also we have Iran
that is developing its missile technology. I am not saying that they are our enemies, but we must take this all
into consideration.119
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He then pointed out a key difference in American and
Russian threat perceptions regarding IRBMs: “They
cannot reach America, but they can very well reach
us.”120
Another important factor contributing to Russia’s
emphasis on BMD derives from the militarized nature
of the Russian economy and society as a whole. Over
the course of history, the country has developed an
image of great-power status and prestige, which rests
largely on its defense capabilities. The military-industrial complex is supposed to be both a source of pride
and, notionally, an engine of progress, as described by
President Putin in his pre-election treatise on national
security:
Sometimes they say the revival of the defense industry
is a yoke for the economy, an extremely heavy burden
that ruined the Soviet Union. I am convinced that is
a profound mistake. . . . The renewal of the militaryindustrial complex will become a locomotive that will
pull the development of various industries: metallurgy, mechanical engineering, the chemical and radioelectronic industries, the entire [information technology] and telecommunications range. . . . The task is
to multiply Russia’s economic power, create an army
and military-industrial complex that will secure Russia’s sovereignty, the respect of our foreign partners
and lasting peace.121

In addition, arms manufacturing is one of the few
industries in which Russia continues to demonstrate
a level of success far surpassing its civilian industrial
and technological achievements, and is able to compete in foreign markets. Russia has managed to maintain its position as the number two exporter of arms to
the world. According to Centre for Analysis of Strategies and Technologies (CAST), the most successful
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businesses in the sector are aerospace and air defense
companies.122 As the story with the Russian contract
to deliver five battalions of the S-300 to Iran among
others shows, arms exports in Russia’s case represent
a powerful instrument of foreign policy.
In terms of national pride, it is remarkable how
regularly Russian officials present new weapon systems as the most sophisticated and capable in the
world, and how particular comparisons are drawn
with American rivals. Thus, Igor Ashurbeyli, the designer of Russia’s most advanced air defense weapons, describes their potential as if the arms race had
never ended: “We are not overtaking someone, we
are not lagging behind, and on the contrary, they [the
United States] are attempting to overtake us.”123 The
tone becomes patronizing when comparing the S-400
and S-300 family with the Patriot systems: “Yes, they
have followed our path, but let’s put it this way, they
haven’t got so far.”124
In common with the almost mythic status of Russia’s nuclear deterrent,125 the importance of Russia’s
air defense arsenal has over time become psychological.126 In order to retain its self-perceived great-power
status, Russia needs capabilities, which can be portrayed as state-of-the-art, which in missile defense
translates into the most sophisticated systems capable
of destroying both IRBMs and ICBMs.
This explains why recent Russian efforts in improving missile defense capabilities have only partly
depended on developments and progress in similar
U.S. efforts. Thus, in 2011, the heyday of the RussoAmerican reset, Russia’s Deputy Prime Minister Dmitry Rogozin stated that Russia will build its national
missile defense system “irrespective of what its Western partners will be doing in this field.” He conceded
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that Russia was “somewhat behind the U.S. in missile defense,” but added that serious efforts had been
made in recent years to restore Russia’s parity in this
area.127
Parity with the United States brings us to the most
serious threat Russian missile defense is supposed to
counter, other than irrelevance in the international
arena; this is vulnerability to U.S. offensive potential.
Russia views specific actions by the United States and
NATO as threats to its security, and the establishment
of a missile defense shield in Europe is at the top of the
list. The Russian position was expressed by Vladimir
Kozin, a member of an interagency working group attached to the Russian presidential administration discussing missile defense issues with NATO, and a leading researcher with the Russian Institute of Strategic
Studies: “The only purpose of the U.S. missile defense
equipment deployed in Europe is to destroy Russian
intercontinental ballistic missiles.”128
Also, the Russian military has sometimes described
the expansion of the VKO capabilities as a response to
U.S. and NATO plans to establish missile defense infrastructure in Eastern Europe. Hence the oblique reference of Lieutenant General Oleg Ostapenko, former
Commander-in-Chief of the VKO, who said the new
Voronezh early warning radars represent “elements
of the nuclear deterrence system. It is only natural
that each new radar put into duty is an additional reason for the concerned parties [the U.S. and NATO] to
think about their actions.”129
In the context of the limited plans for deployment
of U.S. anti-missile systems, there have been doubts
as to whether Russia’s senior leaders really view U.S.
missile defense plans with such deep anxiety. But the
official rhetoric has been consistent. President Putin
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openly described the annexation of Crimea as a preemptive step to foil NATO plans for missile defense in
the Black Sea.
I’ll use this opportunity to say a few words about
our talks on missile defense. This issue is no less, and
probably even more important, than NATO’s eastward expansion. Incidentally, our decision on Crimea
was partially prompted by this.
Needless to say, first and foremost we wanted to support the residents of Crimea, but we also followed
certain logic: If we don’t do anything, Ukraine will be
drawn into NATO sometime in the future. We’ll be
told: ‘This doesn’t concern you,’ and NATO ships will
dock in Sevastopol, the city of Russia’s naval glory.
But it isn’t even the emotional side of the issue. The
point is that Crimea protrudes into the Black Sea, being in its center, as it were. However, in military terms,
it doesn’t have the importance it used to have in the
18th and 19th centuries—I’m referring to modern
strike forces, including coastal ones.
But if NATO troops walk in, they will immediately
deploy these forces there. Such a move would be geopolitically sensitive for us because, in this case, Russia
would be practically ousted from the Black Sea area.
We’d be left with just a small coastline of 450 or 600
kilometers, and that’s it!130

Needless to say, the NATO ships in Sevastopol
would include those equipped with SM-3 missiles and
the ground forces would be “immediately” deployed
with other pieces of missile defense infrastructure,
including powerful radars. Russia believes the U.S.
missile defense shield is “not a defensive system, but
part of the offensive potential deployed far away from
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home.”131 The development of Russia’s missile defense capabilities is aimed at countering this offensive
potential, if nothing else, by dissuading the adversary
from believing a massive surprise attack could be
successful.
In assessing security threats, Russia has always
placed greater emphasis on capabilities than on intentions. Thus, any country possessing capabilities that the
Russian military cannot counter represents an alarming threat. In addition, Russian officials themselves
ascribe this line of reasoning to their American counterparts. State Duma Deputy and Defense Committee
Member Aleksandr Tarnayev, who also happens to
be a former communications officer and KGB military
counterintelligence operative, wrote for bimonthly
defense-industrial journal Vozdushno-Kosmicheskaya
Oborona:
In politics agreements are observed as long as they
are favorable to the strong side. There is no other such
country in the world except Russia with the potential of ensuring guaranteed destruction of the United
States. That is why the Americans are preparing to
fight specifically against us. They have clearly written
in corresponding documents that we are their Enemy
No 1, and not partners, friends, or comrades.132

Devising weapon systems capable of countering
the American threat, therefore, is only natural as the
Russian side always expects the worst from other
countries. The fact that the expansion of the VKO is
to a large extent aimed at countering the U.S. offensive potential was confirmed by the Russian president himself. When visiting one of the facilities for
manufacturing air defense missiles in June 2013, he
observed: “Effective airspace defense is the guarantee
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of strategic nuclear deterrent forces’ survivability and
our country’s protection against attacks by the airspace systems.”133 The reference to the United States is
clear: only the United States is capable of threatening
the survivability of Russia’s strategic nuclear forces
and no other country possesses offensive airspace
systems.
But a closer examination of Russian declarations on strategic deterrence reveals additional complexities. In his 2012 pre-election campaign article,
President Putin wrote:
We can guarantee against upsetting the global balance
of power either by creating our own very expensive
and as yet not very effective missile defense system,
or, much more productively, by ensuring our capability to penetrate any missile defense system and protect
Russia’s retaliation potential.134

This statement is worth dissecting in greater detail. It appears to be a recognition that it is cheaper
and more efficient to attempt to maintain what Russia
sees as strategic balance by designing missiles capable
of penetrating the U.S. missile defense shield, than
by committing trillions of rubles to projects aimed
at reliably protecting millions of square kilometers
and hundreds of locations from massive missile attacks. But Russia appears to be following both logics
simultaneously.
From its earliest days, critics of U.S. missile defense systems have noted that Russia—and other
adversaries—would be prompted to invest in inexpensive (in relative terms) countermeasures to defeat
missile interceptors.135 This is precisely what Russia
has proceeded to do. Russian Deputy Prime Minister Dmitry Rogozin recently described Russia’s test
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of an advanced road-mobile ICBM, called the RS-26
Rubezh, as a “missile defense killer.”136 According to
Russian news reports, the missile flight test involved
three dummy warheads designed to defeat defenses.
But if building Russian missile defenses is “expensive” and “not very effective” against U.S. nuclear
ballistic missiles, which have always been considered
the greatest threat to Russian strategic retaliation capability, why is Russia pushing ahead with investment in anti-missile systems? Leading defense analyst Alexei Arbatov thinks the main task for Russian
airspace defense is to protect the country’s strategic
nuclear forces from U.S. offensive systems of a different kind, namely long-range conventional precisionguided weapons.137 Russian defense commentators
suggest that this threat consists currently of subsonic
sea-launched and air-launched cruise missiles, which
the S-400 can neutralize effectively. But the situation
will change with the introduction of more advanced
systems currently in development under the umbrella
of the Prompt Global Strike (PGS) program.
The U.S. PGS program seeks to develop hypersonic
and other conventional and nuclear weapons capable
of attacking any location on earth within an hour. Elements of the U.S. system are supposed to be fielded
in the next 10 to 15 years. They include boost-glide
systems with hypersonic re-entry vehicles, which can
follow an unpredictable trajectory and could be extremely hard to detect sufficiently in advance—that is,
early enough to launch a retaliatory strike.138
According to Arbatov, “Russian authorities now
consider these weapons, and not the U.S. missile defense systems, to be the main high-tech threat,” since
in this area “Russia has the biggest technology gap to
close.”139 Indeed, senior Russian officers consistently
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highlight the danger of a massive and paralyzing
instantaneous air and missile strike,140 and exercise
scenarios are beginning to practice against this eventuality.141 According to former chief of the Russian General Staff’s Main Operations Directorate LieutenantGeneral Andrey Tretyak:
VKO is a response to the possibility of all campaigns
being in air and space and not reaching the ground
operations stage. . . . [they could assure] victory
through supremacy in the air, space, and information
domains—so VKO is a deterrent. If an opponent is
more technologically advanced, he must risk suffering
unacceptable damage to prevent aggression.142

This concern emphasizes still further the Russian preoccupation with preventing threats to deterrent potential: in this context, “the declining role of
nuclear deterrence, to which Russian authorities give
such a prominent part, must look like an alarming
prospect.”143 It should not therefore be a surprise that
Vladimir Kozin, in his role as member of an interagency working group attached to the Russian presidential
administration discussing missile defense issues with
NATO, complains that the:
Americans completely exclude from the negotiations
such important non-nuclear weapons as anti-missile
systems, anti-satellite weapons and high-precision capabilities that could perform lightning strikes in any
part of the world.144

At the February 28, 2014, annual session of the
Non-departmental Expert Council on VKO Problems,
Igor Ashurbeyli declared with his characteristic outspokenness, “We stand idle, bound by international
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treaties about a ‘peaceful space’ which no one observes, except for us. The militarization of space is inevitable. What’s more, it is vitally needed.”145 The start
of tests of hypersonic missiles by China as well will
only make the Russian headache worse.146
From this perspective, building up missile defense
systems as well as enhancing the survivability of offensive missiles could appear to be a prudent insurance
policy. This was confirmed by two senior officers from
the Russian General Staff Academy in 2012. Speaking at NATO Defense College in Rome, they told the
audience that Russian missile defense is a “military
response to a new threat for the medium- and longterm forecasts over decades—all possibilities. The task
is not to allow the worst case scenario to develop.”147
CONCLUSION
Over the last 8 years, Russia has significantly modernized its air defense systems, expanding them geographically and making them more versatile, mobile,
and effective. The interceptors introduced in this period, mainly on the S-400 platform, give Russia the capability to counter a wide range of missile threats up
to and including IRBMs in some of the most important
and/or vulnerable parts of its territory.
Further improvement and geographical expansion
of air defense capabilities will depend on the ability of
arms manufacturers to deal with increased demands of
the State Armament Program. One of the main bottlenecks—the design, production, and troubleshooting
of the newest long-range interceptors—significantly
restricts the operational range of the S-400 by denying it the intended long-range interceptors, and will
in all probability cause still further substantial delays
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in introducing the S-500. The commissioning of this
system before 2020 is unlikely.
If published figures are to be believed, the S-400
represents the apex of current air defense capabilities,
and is in many respects more capable than the U.S.
Patriot series. However, comparisons with THAAD
and SM-3 missiles could be misleading, as these systems were developed solely for the purpose of missile
defense and their design follows an entirely different
philosophy. Russia’s goal is to protect its territory
from within its borders, using a multilayered shield
of several complementary systems, including, but not
limited to, the S-400 and the S-500. The United States
is focusing heavily on countering ballistic missiles in
various stages of their flight, which requires a missile
defense shield of global reach and presence.
According to open sources and statements by Russian officials, Russian ultra-long-range interceptors,
which are still in development, should offer better
performance than their American rivals and should
be able to counter ICBMs. However, many experts
doubt their stated ability to neutralize nuclear warheads at high altitudes using high-precision hit-to-kill
technology.
Nevertheless, entirely predictably, Russian officials and servicemen portray their air defense systems, whether commissioned or still in development,
as being the best in the world. This derives from the
fact that assertions of this kind significantly contribute to Russia’s much vaunted great-power status,
competitiveness on the global arms market, and, in
Russian eyes, the flourishing of the Russian economy.
This, together with the increasing threat of ballistic
missile proliferation along the long perimeter of Russia’s southern borders, is one of the reasons why the
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enhancement of Russia’s air defense capabilities is
not a direct and symmetrical response to U.S. missile
defense deployments in Europe.
The capabilities of the new VKO, built around
the S-400 and other systems, can hardly protect Russian retaliatory capability, let alone the entire strategic forces, as nearly half of the S-400 regiments are
currently stationed near Moscow where no strategic
forces are based. The Russian missile defense shield
is “expensive” and “not very effective” at best and a
“myth” at worst. Its main raison d’être is to serve as
a deterrent against a single more technologically advanced rival, who seeks the capability to destroy any
target anywhere in the world within an hour.
Within the Russian understanding of strategic stability, future planned VKO assets could be considered
a stabilizing factor, since they could eventually make
a first disarming strike impractical. But the Russian
narrative has not developed to include reasonable
explanations such as this. Instead, superficial arguments (for example, that the VKO system is less immoral than U.S. BMD because it is built within Russia
and does not approach toward U.S. borders) are being
repeated as mantras.148
POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS
The military implications of Russia devoting huge
investment specifically to countering U.S. plans for
strike capabilities are obvious, and it is to be hoped
that the intended results are already the subject of intensive study by the U.S. intelligence community. But
in addition to the purely technical realm of capability, Russian missile defense developments provide a
political opportunity for the United States to mitigate
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some of the transactional costs of Russian opposition
to the U.S. deployment of anti-missile systems.
Russian plans for the introduction of enhanced
ABM capabilities have a much more nebulous timescale than the declared schedule for EPAA. Prior
experience of development setbacks for the S-500
program—including the original flight test date passing by before construction of the production facilities
had even started—together with known overloading
of Almaz-Antey’s production capacity suggest that
it will be some time before the long-promised S-500
actually appears in the flesh.
But regardless of the actual state of real-life capabilities, Russian declaratory policy provides U.S. policymakers with significant material to develop an approach intended to mitigate Russian obstructionism
over EPAA and U.S. plans for BMD more broadly. Put
simply, Russian complaints at the dangerous U.S. irresponsibility of introducing new anti-missile capabilities ring hollow when Russia is forging ahead with its
own program to do precisely the same. If the performance and capabilities claimed for new Russian systems are accurate, they pose at least as great a threat to
deterrence as do SM-3s.
The paradox was pointed out by Roberto Zadra,
Head of the BMD Section of NATO’s Defense Investment Division, at the Royal United Services Institute
(RUSI) Missile Defense Conference in June 2013. Zadra
reversed the Russian argument of missile defense being a dangerous threat to strategic stability, and asked
rhetorically why there was no NATO discussion of
planned S-500 systems as a similar threat. By applying
the same logic, he asked, how could the S-500 be anything other than destabilizing—all the more so since
its proposed capabilities are so highly classified?149
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U.S. officials have repeatedly attempted to allay
Russian concerns over the potential for EPAA and its
predecessor systems to compromise Russian strategic
deterrence. These attempts have foundered on Russian concerns, some of which appear disingenuous,
but others of which are genuinely rooted in an entirely different Russian approach to the purpose and
status of nuclear weapons.150 Despite the current hiatus in relations, opportunities for meaningful dialog
with Russia on missile defense will arise again in the
future. At that point, U.S. representatives should be
fully informed on the scope and ambition of Russia’s
own missile defense programs. This will allow them
not only to rebut some of the more facile Russian accusations, but also to counter some persistent Russian
arguments relating to strategic balance.
In brief, discussion of Russian capabilities should
be an integral part of future conversations with Russia
on the deployment of U.S. and allied BMD assets.
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